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I. INTRODUCTION
A hypothetical young entrepreneur named Ernest
recently read an article reporting that marijuana distribution
was a lucrative business. After extensive research and
discussions with some friends who work in the “marijuana
industry,” Ernest decided to open a retail store selling
marijuana in his hometown of Raleigh, North Carolina. He
entered a supply agreement with a local horticulturist who was
also an expert marijuana grower. Ernest named his business
“Best Buds Dispensary, Inc.,” registered it with the secretary of
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state’s office, rented a storefront in a strip mall, outfitted the
space with display cases and shelving, hung some signs, hired
a few employees, and opened for business on December 1, 2016.
His dispensary sold loose-leaf marijuana, marijuana joints, and
so-called “marijuana edibles.”
The business operated on a cash-only basis, and
business was booming due in part to an advertising campaign
Ernest started on social media. In the first week, Ernest sold
over 60 kilograms of marijuana and generated a profit of
$50,000. To protect himself, his product, and his profit from
would-be robbers, Ernest hired an armed security guard to
serve as a sentry at the dispensary’s entrance. Ernest opened a
business account at the local bank. The bank manager asked
some questions before eventually allowing Ernest to use the
account to deposit large amounts of cash generated from the
dispensary.
Ernest made no secret of the fact that Best Buds
Dispensary, Inc. sold marijuana. Everybody in town knew
what he was up to, and it did not take long for Ernest to appear
on the radar screen of agents with the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). Within a month, DEA
agents raided his dispensary while waiving a federal search
warrant in the air. The agents not only seized the marijuana
found in the dispensary, they also went to the local bank with a
court order authorizing them to seize the contents of Best Buds
Dispensary’s bank account.
A short time later, the U.S. Attorney’s Office presented
the matter to the grand jury. The grand jury returned an
indictment charging Ernest with a slew of serious federal
charges, including distribution of marijuana, 2 renting a
property for the purpose of drug distribution, 3 advertising the
distribution of a controlled substance, 4 money laundering, 5 and
221

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). This provision of the federal code is commonly
referred to as the “crackhouse statute.” See generally Michael E.
Rayfield, Pure Consumption Cases under the Federal “Crackhouse” Statute,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (2008).
421 U.S.C. § 843(c)(2)(A) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly or intentionally use the Internet, or cause the Internet to be
used, to advertise the sale of . . . a controlled substance . . . .”).
518 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957.
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aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime. 6 The indictment also included an
allegation seeking forfeiture of the bank account’s contents, as
well as any other property that Ernest obtained using the
proceeds from his marijuana dispensary. 7 If convicted, Ernest
would be sent to federal prison for a significant period of time. 8
And, the charges were not limited to Ernest. The grand
jury also charged the local bank with money laundering for
allowing Ernest to conduct financial transactions using drug
money. 9 Additionally, the grand jury charged the armed
security guard who protected Ernest, his money, and his

618

U.S.C. § 2; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
U.S.C. § 853(a) (providing for forfeiture of “any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained
directly, or indirectly, as the result” of violating the federal drug laws).
8Conviction on the firearm charge alone would result in a five-year
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that a defendant convicted of a § 924(c) offense
shall “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5
years”). And, that five-year term of imprisonment would be served
consecutive to the imprisonment imposed on the other charges. See
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (“no term of imprisonment imposed on a
person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of
imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed”).
9The bank would most likely face money-laundering charges under 18
U.S.C. § 1956 and/or 18 U.S.C. §1957. See Julie Anderson Hill, Banks,
Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 617 (2015) (“In
sum, a financial institution that knowingly processes transactions for
marijuana-related businesses commits the crime of money
laundering.”). That is so because, generally speaking, both statutes
prohibit banks from knowingly engaging in transactions—such as
deposits, transfers, and withdrawals—that involve the proceeds of
drug trafficking. See generally Christie Smythe, HSBC Judge Approves
$1.9B
Drug-Money
Laundering
Accord,
Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-02/hsbcjudge-approves-1-9b-drug-money-laundering-accord (last visited
January 19, 2017) (discussing the $1.9 million deferred prosecution
agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and HSBC bank to
resolve money laundering charges stemming from transactions
involving the proceeds of drug trafficking).
721
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marijuana with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime. 10
Now, imagine that Ernest operated his marijuana
dispensary in Denver, Colorado instead of Raleigh, North
Carolina. The story would be much different. The DEA agents
stationed in Colorado—agents who work for the same DEA and
are sworn to uphold the same federal laws as the DEA agents
stationed in North Carolina—would have conducted no raids,
secured no search warrants, and seized no funds. The U.S.
Attorney in Colorado—who works for the same U.S.
Department of Justice and is sworn to uphold the same federal
laws as the U.S. Attorney in North Carolina—would have
sought no grand jury indictments and instituted no forfeiture
proceedings. Instead of contemplating what life would be like
inside of a Federal Bureau of Prisons’ facility, Ernest would be
in his dispensary selling marijuana and counting his (large
amount) of cash. He would be depositing that money in his
account at the local bank, and his armed security guard would
be standing by his side. Although federal law is the same in
Colorado as it is in North Carolina, the DEA Agents and
Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Colorado would drive by Ernest’s
dispensary and do nothing about his blatant and unapologetic
violations of crystal clear federal law.
This hypothetical, unfortunately, is not some far-fetched
scenario dreamt up by an imaginative law professor. No, it is
an illustration of exactly what has been happening in the United
States. Marijuana is a controlled substance that is strictly
prohibited under federal law; 11 nonetheless, seven states and
the District of Columbia have passed measures legalizing
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); see generally United States v. Archuleta, 19 F.
App’x 827, 829-30 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 924(c) conviction for a
defendant whose role in the conspiracy was “kind of like a guard,”
and who “possessed the given firearm for the specific purpose of
providing security”).
11See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (explaining the criteria for listing a drug as
a schedule I controlled substance); 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule 1(c)(10)
(listing marijuana in schedule I); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (stating that it is
unlawful to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance”); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (stating that it is unlawful for “any
person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance”).
1018
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marijuana for recreational use. 12 And a total of twenty-six states
have legalized marijuana for medical purposes. 13 Rather than
challenging those state laws under the Supremacy Clause, and
instead of continuing to enforce the longstanding federal law
equally across the country, the U.S. Department of Justice under
Attorney General Eric Holder announced that it would neither
seek to preempt state legalization measures 14 nor (absent
exceptional circumstances) bring federal marijuana charges
against individuals in those states. 15 Moreover, the Department
of Justice and the Department of Treasury have informed
financial institutions that, money laundering laws
notwithstanding, they may “offer[][financial] services to a
marijuana-related business.” 16 And, an entire industry has
sprung up to provide marijuana dispensaries with armed
12State

Marijuana
Laws
2016
Map
(available
at
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-mapmedical-recreational.html).
13Id.
14Aug. 29, 2013 Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to
Governors of Colorado and Washington (stating that “the
Department will not at this time seek to challenge your state’s law”).
15Aug. 29, 2013 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James
M. Cole to all United States Attorneys (announcing that, as an exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, the Department would not prosecute
marijuana cases in those states that have “legalized” marijuana, except
in extreme cases where specified criteria were satisfied); see also
October 19, 2009 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David
W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys (stating that federal
prosecutors in states that have authorized medical marijuana “should
not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state
laws providing for the medical use of marijuana”).
16February 14, 2014 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
James M. Cole to All United States Attorneys, “Guidance Regarding
Marijuana Related Financial Crimes”; Fin. Crimes Enforcement
Network, Dep’t of the Treasury, FIN-2014-G0001, BSA Expectations
Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses (Feb. 14, 2014) (providing
guidance to banks that “should enhance the availability of financial
services for, and the financial transparency of, marijuana-related
businesses” in those states that passed “recent state initiatives to
legalize certain marijuana-related activity”); see also Hill, supra note 9,
at 604 (“The guidance explains that the agencies do not prioritize
punishment of banks servicing state-legal marijuana businesses.”).
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security guards. 17 That same Department of Justice, however,
has continued to prosecute marijuana cases in the remaining
states. 18 This is a problem. Indeed, some have called it a
“crisis,” 19 others a “quagmire.” 20 Regardless of what it is called,
one thing is for certain—it must be resolved.
It should be noted at the outset that this Article has little
do with marijuana per se. There is a legitimate debate to be had
regarding our national marijuana policy. Perhaps the time has
come to move marijuana out of Schedule I of the Controlled
Substances List, which would authorize it to be used
medicinally. Or, maybe we should consider decriminalizing
marijuana altogether. The fact of the matter, however, is that
neither of those things has happened. Instead, federal law is
clear—marijuana is illegal in all fifty states. If that is going to
change, it must be done in the way our Founding Fathers

17Will Yakowicz, The Highly Trained Security Force Protecting Colorado’s
Weed
Stash,
Inc.
(Apr.
20,
2015)
(available
at,
http://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/inside-the-backbone-of-thecannabis-industry.html) (reporting on the activities of Blue Line
Protection Group’s business of providing armed security for
Colorado’s marijuana dispensaries and marijuana growing
operations); see also Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look
Like?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 689, 693-94 (2015) (recognizing that
“every Colorado marijuana business owner who employs an armed
security guard could wind up serving an effective life sentence in
prison” if the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were enforced).
18See generally David Sinclar, Village Man to Forfeit $1 Million in Drug
Case,
The
Pilot
(April
28,
2016)
(available
at
http://www.thepilot.com/news/village-man-to-forfeit-million-indrug-case/article_3a35452a-0d72-11e6-9e61-571d44b5d3fb.html)
(reporting that a North Carolina businessman who was convicted on
federal marijuana and money laundering charges faced a federal
prison sentence and was required to forfeit $1,000,000 in proceeds
from the marijuana sales).
19Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana Through
Executive Branch Nonenforcement, Note, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 293
(2015) (quoting David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana
Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 575 (2013)).
20Melanie Reid, The Quagmire that Nobody in the Federal Government
Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 NEW MEX. L. REV. 169 (2014).
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envisioned: the passage of a bill in Congress that is signed into
law by the President.
Along with a host of other serious matters, the future of
federal marijuana enforcement will soon be landing on the desk
of Jeff Sessions, the newly appointed Attorney General. It is
clear from his confirmation hearing testimony that Sessions is
aware of the issue and recognizes that deciding how to handle
it “won’t be an easy decision.” 21 He further stated that “the
United States Congress has made the possession of marijuana
in every state and distribution of it an illegal act. . . . If that . . .
is not desired any longer, Congress should pass the law to
change the rule. It’s not so much the attorney general’s job to
decide what laws to enforce.” 22 At several other points during
the hearing, Sessions reiterated his firm commitment to
enforcing federal law and following the Constitution. 23
Unless and until Congress changes the law, fulfilling
that commitment will require the Department of Justice to alter
its approach to those states that have legalized marijuana. The
current approach is unsustainable and sets a dangerous
precedent that threatens the very existence of our federal
system. It also violates two provisions of the United States
Constitution: (1) the Supremacy Clause; and (2) the Take Care
Clause.
First, state laws authorizing the possession,
manufacture, distribution, and use of marijuana conflict with
the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). More specifically,
the state laws stand as an obstacle to the federal goal of
eliminating the manufacture, distribution, and possession of
marijuana. The state laws, therefore, are preempted by
operation of the Supremacy Clause. Second, the Department of
Wallace, Jeff Sessions Vague About Marijuana Strategy at AG
Senate Hearing, The Cannabist, (Jan. 10, 2017) (available at,
http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/01/10/jeff-sessionsconfirmation-hearing-marijuana-enforcement-first-day/71005/).
22Id.
23See Steven Dennis & Chris Strohm, Sessions Seeks to Reassure Senators
on Race, Torture, Clinton, Bloomberg Politics (Jan. 10, 2017) (available
at,
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-0110/sessions-cites-crime-rebuts-racism-in-u-s-attorney-general-bid)
(reporting that Attorney General Sessions testified “he would enforce
the laws and Supreme Court decisions—even those he disagreed
with”).
21Alicia
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Justice’s non-enforcement policy in those states that have
legalized marijuana represents a breach of the Presidential
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 24
The Take Care Clause requires the President—and his
surrogates—to enforce the laws passed by Congress, regardless
of whether those laws align with his policy preferences. 25 The
current approach is inconsistent with that requirement.
Prosecutors, of course, have broad discretion in
deciding what cases to bring. As a former federal prosecutor,
that discretion is something I know quite well. Prosecutorial
discretion, however, is not boundless. And, it does not extend
so far as to allow the Department of Justice to adopt a policy
that bases the decision to prosecute on the law of the state
where the conduct occurred. Similarly, a state should be unable
to fill its coffers with hundreds of millions of dollars in tax
revenue generated from an activity that flies in the face of
federal law while other states are deprived of such revenue by
their commendable choice to follow federal law. 26 There is
something fundamentally wrong (and, frankly, offensive)
about allowing people to be richly rewarded for their blatant
and open defiance of well-settled law. 27 That is especially true
24Art.

II, § 3, U.S. Const.
J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the Dream Act, and
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (stating that the
“Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the President a duty to
enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and
cases”).
26See generally Carlos Illescas, Marijuana Sales Tax Revenue Huge Boon
for Colorado Cities, Denver Post (May 26, 2016) (available at,
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/26/marijuana-sales-taxrevenue-huge-boon-for-colorado-cities/) (discussing the millions in
dollars of tax revenue that have been generated by the Colorado law
permitting recreational marijuana use and reporting that city of
Denver alone “took in $29 million last year from all sales by taxes and
licensing fees”); see also Tanya Basu, Colorado Raised More Tax Revenue
From Marijuana Than From Alcohol, Time Magazine (Sep. 16, 2015)
(“Legal recreational marijuana is a boon for tax revenues in Colorado
. . . . Colorado collected almost $70 million in marijuana taxes.”).
27See
Lucy Rock, Marijuana Millionaires Cashing in on Cannabis
Legalisation, The Guardian (May 22, 2016) (available at,
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/may/22/cashing-in25Robert
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when people doing the same thing in another part of the
country are being sent to federal prison and having their money
forfeited to the federal government. 28
This Article explains why the Department of Justice’s
marijuana policy over the past eight years violates the
Constitution. Part II tells the story of how we ended up where
we are today. It discusses the history of federal marijuana
regulation, including the CSA’s treatment of marijuana as a
Schedule I drug. Part III provides an overview of recent state
marijuana legalization measures. It also discusses the federal
government’s response to those measures. Part IV discusses the
Supremacy Clause, and Part V discusses the Take Care Clause.
Part VI consists of a brief conclusion.

II. THE FEDERAL PROHIBITION ON MARIJUANA
Marijuana has been regulated by federal law since 1937
when Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act. 29 The Tax Act
“allowed marijuana to be sold and prescribed medically so long
on-cannabis-legalisation) (reporting that one marijuana business
owner in Washington made over $3 million in his first twenty months
of business); see also Vickie Bane & Trevor Dodd, Marijuana
Millionaires
(July
28,
2014)
(available,
at
http://people.com/archive/marijuana-millionaires-vol-82-no-4/)
(reporting that one owner of a marijuana dispensary in Colorado
“raked in $47,000 in 24 hours; within three months, he says, he grossed
$1.5 million”).
28See, e.g., United States v. White, Case No. 12-cr-03045-BCW, 2016 WL
4473803, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2016) (rejecting motion to dismiss
filed by defendant who was being federally prosecuted for growing
marijuana in Missouri—a state that has not legalized marijuana); see
also David Sinclar, Village Man to Forfeit $1 Million in Drug Case, The
Pilot
(April
28,
2016)
(available
at
http://www.thepilot.com/news/village-man-to-forfeit-million-indrug-case/article_3a35452a-0d72-11e6-9e61-571d44b5d3fb.html)
(reporting that a North Carolina businessman who was convicted on
federal marijuana and money laundering charges faced a federal
prison sentence and was required to forfeit $1,000,000 in proceeds
from the marijuana sales).
29Andrew Renehan, Clearing the Haze Surrounding State Medical
Marijuana Laws: A Preemption Analysis and Proposed Solutions, 14 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 299 (2014).
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as the requisite tax was paid.” 30 Fourteen years later in 1951,
Congress criminalized marijuana with the passage of the Boggs
Act. 31 The Boggs Act was a hard-hitting statute that imposed a
mandatory minimum sentence of two years’ imprisonment for
first-time marijuana offenders, five years’ imprisonment for a
second offense, and ten years’ imprisonment for any additional
offenses. 32 The Boggs Act was largely replaced in 1970 by the
CSA. 33 The CSA was a massive enactment intended to
“combat[] drug abuse and control[] the legitimate and
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.” 34 To that end, the
CSA “create[d] a comprehensive, closed regulatory regime
criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution,
dispensing, and possession” 35 of “various plants, drugs, and
chemicals (such as narcotics, stimulants, depressants,
hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids.” 36 Although it has been
tweaked from time to time, the CSA remains the predominant
federal drug law today.
The CSA divides the regulated substances into five
different “schedules.” Drugs are “scheduled” based on their
potential for abuse, accepted use for medical treatment, and
their psychological and physical impact on the body. 37
Schedule I drugs are subject to the most stringent regulation,
while Schedule V drugs are subject to the least. 38 The
manufacture, distribution, possession, or use of Schedule I

30Id.
31Id.

32See

Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances: Crime, Regulation, and Policy
at 408 (Carolina Academic Press 2013) (discussing the evolution of
federal marijuana law).
33Id. at 409.
34Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2005).
35Id.
36Todd Garvey & Brian T. Yeh, State Legalization of Recreational
Marijuana: Selected Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service (Jan.
13, 2014).
37Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).
38Id.
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drugs is flatly prohibited regardless of whether intended for
medical or recreational use. Schedule I drugs “may not be
dispensed under a prescription, and such substances may only
be used for bona fide, federal government-approved research
studies.” 39 That is so because a drug listed in Schedule I has
been determined to have a “high potential for abuse,” “no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States,” and “a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical
supervision.” 40 From the CSA’s effective date until today,
marijuana has been listed on Schedule I. 41 As a result, it cannot
be lawfully manufactured, distributed, or possessed anywhere
in the United States. 42
For years, there have been efforts to move marijuana
from Schedule I to one of the less regulated schedules. 43 The
rescheduling of marijuana could occur in two ways: (1)
legislatively by way of an amendment to the CSA, or (2)
administratively by the Attorney General, acting in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. 44 Despite years of debate, Congress has taken no
action to remove marijuana from Schedule I. 45 The most recent
supra note 36, at 6.
U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C).
4121 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule I (c)(10); Garvey, supra note 36, at 7 (“When
Congress enacted the CSA in 1970, marijuana was classified as a
Schedule I drug. Today, marijuana is still categorized as a Schedule I
controlled substance and is therefore subject to the most severe
restrictions contained within the CSA.”).
42Garvey, supra note 36, at 7 (“Pursuant to the CSA, the unauthorized
cultivation, distribution, or possession of marijuana is a federal
crime.”). The only exception to the flat prohibition is federally
approved research. Raich, 545 U.S. at 13 (stating that the “sole
exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug
Administration preapproved research study”).
43See Raich, 545 U.S. at 13, n.23 (describing various unsuccessful efforts
to reschedule marijuana).
4421 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b) (establishing the process that must be followed
for the Attorney General to reschedule a controlled substance).
45See Paul Lewis, A Gateway to Future Problems: Concerns About the
State-by-State Legalization of Medical Marijuana, 13 UNIV. N. H. L. REV.
39Garvey,
4021
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attempt at administrative rescheduling was denied in August
of 2016 during the tenure of Loretta Lynch, President Obama’s
second Attorney General. 46 Moving marijuana from Schedule I
to a less regulated schedule would not legalize marijuana for
recreational purposes. It would, however, allow marijuana to
be prescribed by a physician—much like opiate-based
painkillers (Schedule II) or anabolic steroids (Schedule III).
Equally unsuccessful have been attempts by marijuana
advocates to have the federal judiciary strike down the CSA’s
regulation of marijuana. Advocates have challenged the
constitutionality of applying the CSA to purely intrastate
marijuana growers and users whose actions complied with a
California law authorizing medicinal marijuana. 47 More
specifically, the proponents argued that applying the CSA to
homegrown marijuana would exceed Congress’ power under
the Commerce Clause. 48 The Supreme Court rejected that
argument in Gonzales v. Raich, holding that the “regulation [of
intrastate marijuana] is squarely within Congress’ commerce
power because production of the commodity meant for home
consumption . . . has a substantial effect on supply and demand
in the national market for that commodity.” 49 In support of its
conclusion, the Court stated that Congress had reasonably
found that allowing locally grown marijuana “would

49, 57 (2014) (recognizing that “federal lawmakers have been, and
continue to be, adamantly opposed to the legalization of marijuana”).
46Catherine Saint Louis, DEA Keeps Marijuana on List of Dangerous
Drugs, Frustrating Advocates, New York Times (Aug. 11, 2016). The
2016 refusal to reschedule marijuana was not all that surprising, given
Attorney General Lynch’s stated opposition to legalizing marijuana at
the federal level. See generally Matt Ferner, Loretta Lynch Says She
Doesn’t Support Marijuana Legalization or Obama’s Views on Pot,
Huffington
Post
(Jan.
28,
2015)
(available
at,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/28/loretta-lynchmarijuana_n_6565962.html).
47Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6 (2005).
48Id.
49Id. at 20.
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undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory
scheme.” 50
Raich was not the first time the Supreme Court
addressed the applicability of the CSA to state medical
marijuana laws. Four years earlier, the Court decided United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative. 51 In that case, a
cooperative was formed to distribute medical marijuana under
California law. 52 The U.S. Department of Justice sued the
cooperative, seeking to enjoin the cooperative on the basis that
its conduct violated the CSA. 53 The cooperative argued that the
CSA contained an implied exception that allowed marijuana to
be distributed and used when it was medically necessary. 54 The
Supreme Court rejected that argument because by placing
marijuana in Schedule I, “the balance already has been struck
against a medical necessity exception” by Congress. 55 And, the
judiciary lacks the authority to “override Congress’s policy
choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be
prohibited.” 56
The lower federal courts have also repeatedly rejected
claims that the CSA’s treatment of marijuana as a Schedule I
drug violates substantive due process or equal protection. 57 Put
simply, marijuana proponents have made very little progress at
the federal level—marijuana is as illegal under federal law
50Id.

at 28.
U.S. 483 (2001).
52Id. at 486.
53Id. at 486-87.
54Id. at 490.
55Id. at 499.
56Id. at 497.
57See e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Raich II”) (rejecting argument that CSA’s treatment of marijuana as
a Schedule I drug violated substantive due process because “federal
law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical
marijuana”); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting argument that CSA’s treatment of marijuana was
“irrational”); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1973)
(stating “we cannot say that [marijuana’s] placement in Schedule I is
so arbitrary or unreasonable as to render it unconstitutional”).
51532
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today as it was on the day the CSA was enacted in 1970. But,
the story has been much different in the states. That is
especially true of the past ten years.

III. STATE EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE
For over twenty-five years after the passage of the CSA,
marijuana was prohibited under federal law and the laws of
every state. 58 That changed in 1996 when California passed the
Compassionate Use Act. 59 The Act allowed “seriously ill”
patients and their caregivers to “possess[] or cultivate[]
marijuana for the patient’s medical purposes upon the
recommendation or approval of a physician.” 60 Several years
later, Oregon and Washington passed state laws authorizing
medical marijuana. 61 By the year 2004, ten states had such
laws. 62
The initial federal response to those laws was
understandably hostile given the existence of the CSA. Federal
officials filed lawsuits, 63 obtained injunctions, 64 conducted
raids, instituted prosecutions, 65 and developed a plan for
58Raich

II, 500 F.3d at 856 (explaining that “from 1970 to 1996, the
possession or use of marijuana—medically or otherwise—was
proscribed under state and federal law”).
59Id.
60United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S.
483, 486 (2001).
61Robert A. Mikos, On Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the
States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421,
1423 n. 6 (listing states that have passed laws allowing medical
marijuana).
62Id.
63See id.
64See id.
65See Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 689, 690 (2015) (“By one estimate, the federal
government spent $483 million dollars interfering with state medical
marijuana laws between 1996 and 2012, conducting at least 528 raids
and dozens of prosecutions of people operating in compliance with
state medical marijuana laws.”); see also Lewis, supra note 45, at 59
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helping state and local police agencies fight against medical
marijuana efforts. 66 Thus, the Department of Justice “under the
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations” aggressively
fought state medical marijuana legalization efforts. 67
The Department of Justice’s approach changed
dramatically, however, after Eric Holder, Jr. was sworn in as the
82nd Attorney General of the United States. 68 The clearest sign
that there was a new (and less stringent) sheriff in town took
the form of a “Memorandum for Selected United States
Attorneys” that was issued on October 19, 2009, by Deputy
Attorney General David Ogden. In that memorandum, Ogden
informed U.S. Attorneys that they “should not focus federal
resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana.” 69 The Ogden
Memorandum represented a major policy shift by the
Department of Justice, and marijuana reformers viewed it as a
turning point in the fight to loosen marijuana restrictions. 70
Although the Ogden Memorandum contained its fair share of
(“The battle against state medical marijuana legalization intensified
under the administration of George W. Bush, as Assistant U.S.
Attorneys prosecuted several high-profile medical marijuana
suppliers during these eight years.”).
66Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Role of States in Shaping the Legal Debate
on Medical Marijuana, 42 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 697, 738 (2016)
(explaining the historical approach of the federal government to state
medical marijuana laws).
67Id.
68See Lewis, supra, note 45, at 60 (stating that President Obama’s
administration, in which Eric Holder served as Attorney General, took
a “180-degree turn from the medical marijuana policies of its
predecessors”).
69October 19, 2009 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
David W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys.
70Lewis, supra note 45, at 60 (stating that “[i]n 2009, the Obama
administration declared that it would take a political 180-degree turn
from the medical marijuana policies of its predecessors”); see also ShuAcquaye, supra note 66, at 740 (explaining that the Ogden
Memorandum was viewed initially as “a groundbreaking shift in
federal drug policy”).
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double-talk and caveats, 71 it was widely viewed as a clear signal
that “the Department of Justice (DOJ) would stop enforcing the
federal marijuana ban against persons who comply with state
medical marijuana laws.” 72 There can be no denying that it
provided a huge boost to the efforts of state marijuana
legalization proponents. Additional states moved almost
immediately to legalize medical marijuana, and “the
nationwide medical marijuana industry . . . [has grown] at a rate
of 13.8 percent since 2009.” 73
In a move that surprised many observers, the
Department appeared to take a step back on June 29, 2011 with
the release of a Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
James Cole. That memorandum was entitled “Guidance
Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to
Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use,” and it reaffirmed the
Department of Justice’s commitment “to the enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act in all States.” 74 And, it further stated
that the Ogden Memorandum was “never intended to shield”
large commercial, industrial marijuana growing operations
from “federal enforcement action and prosecution, even where
those activities purport to comply with state law.” 75 Despite the
2011 Cole Memorandum, state marijuana legalization measures
did not stop.
In fact, they intensified—branching out from medical
marijuana to legalization of marijuana for recreational
purposes. 76 Both Colorado and Washington passed measures

71For example, the Memorandum stated that it was merely “guidance”

and that “no State can authorize violations of federal law.”
72Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 633 (2011).
73Lewis, supra note 45, at 62 (quoting statistics compiled by IBSWorld,
a marijuana industry reporting company).
74June 29, 2011 Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United States
Attorneys.
75Id.
76COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
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in November of 2012 that legalized recreational marijuana. 77 A
short time later, the Department of Justice issued yet another
Memorandum relating to state marijuana legalization efforts.
In that Memorandum issued on August 29, 2013, Deputy
Attorney General James Cole told federal prosecutors in those
states that have legalized marijuana to leave even the largescale industrial marijuana growers alone, so long as they were
operating in compliance with eight principles: (1) not selling to
minors; (2) preventing money from going to criminal gangs and
cartels; (3) preventing diversion to those states that have not
legalized marijuana; (4) not using the distribution of marijuana
as a cover for trafficking in other drugs; (5) avoiding violence
and the use of firearms; (6) preventing impaired driving and
other public health issues associated with marijuana use; (7) not
growing marijuana on public lands; and (8) not possessing or
using marijuana on federal property. 78
Also on August 29, 2013, Attorney General Holder sent
a letter to the governors of Colorado and Washington. In that
letter, Attorney General Holder informed the governors that the
Department of Justice would “not at this time seek to challenge
your state’s law.” 79 Put another way, Attorney General Holder
assured the governors that the Department of Justice would not
seek to preempt the Colorado and Washington laws under the
Supremacy Clause. That letter, combined with the Cole
Memorandum issued the same day, was tantamount to the
Department of Justice waving the white flag of surrender. It
was surrender, however, to a battle that the Department had
stopped trying to win four years earlier. And, the marijuana
industry responded by aggressively expanding the list of states
Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes in Colorado, Washington,
CNNMoney
(Nov.
8,
2012)
(available
at,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/marijuanalegalization-washington-colorado/).
78Aug. 29, 2013, Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United
States Attorneys at, 1-2.
79Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Governors of Colorado
& Washington (Aug. 29, 2013).
77Aaron
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that allow marijuana to be used in one form or another.
California, Oregon, Nevada, Alaska, Massachusetts, Maine,
and the District of Columbia have all recently joined Colorado
and Washington by legalizing recreational marijuana. 80 The
number of states authorizing medical marijuana is now at
twenty-six, plus the District of Columbia. 81 Thus, over half of
the states now expressly permit what federal law expressly
prohibits. The Department of Justice has allowed blatant
violations of the CSA’s marijuana prohibition in those states,
but at the same time it has continued to enforce those same
marijuana prohibitions in other states. That is the status quo,
and it raises serious constitutional problems. Those problems
are discussed below.

IV. PREEMPTION
As things stand today, on one side there is a federal law
that prohibits manufacturing, distributing, and possessing
marijuana. On the other side, there are state laws that authorize
manufacturing, distributing, and possessing marijuana. Under
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution when federal
and state law clash, federal law prevails, and the state law is
preempted. 82 That is what should happen here—the state laws
legalizing marijuana must give way to the federal CSA.

80State

Marijuana
Laws
in
2016
Map
(available
at,
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-mapmedical-recreational.html.)
81Id.
82U.S. CONST. art. VI, (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see Mikos, supra note
61, at 1422 (explaining that “if Congress possesses the authority to
regulate an activity, its laws reign supreme and trump conflicting
state regulations on the same subject”).
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Although some legal commentators have said as much, 83 the
issue has not been addressed by the federal courts because the
Department of Justice refused to file a lawsuit against the
offending states. 84 There is, however, a new captain steering
the ship at the Department of Justice. With the swearing in of
Jeff Sessions as Attorney General comes the possibility of a
lawsuit seeking to preempt state laws that conflict with the
CSA. If Attorney General Sessions chooses to go down that
road, he will have a strong legal argument.
Preemption is a “doctrine of American constitutional
law under which states and local governments are deprived of
their power to act in a given area” due to the existence of a
federal law that operates in that same area. 85 The Supreme
Court has recognized two broad categories of preemption: (1)
express preemption, and (2) implied preemption. 86 Express
preemption occurs when Congress passes a statute that
explicitly withdraws certain powers from the states. 87 In
circumstances where Congress has failed to make an explicit
83See,

e.g., Brandon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal
Federalism, and Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567, 579 (2015) (explaining that “[i]t seems
axiomatic that the Supremacy Clause and preemption doctrine
prohibit states” such as Colorado and Washington from allowing
marijuana when federal law prohibits it); Garvey, supra note 36, at 7
(“The Colorado and Washington laws, which legalize, regulate, and
tax an activity the federal government expressly prohibits, appear to
be logically inconsistent with established federal policy and are
therefore likely subject to a legal challenge under the constitutional
doctrine of preemption.”); but see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of
Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to
Legalize a Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009) (opining
that preemption of state marijuana laws would run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle).
84Aug. 29, 2013 Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to
Governors of Washington & Colorado
85James T. O’Reilly, Federal Preemption of State and Local Law:
Legislation, Regulation and Litigation at 1 (ABA Publishing 2006).
86See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000)
(providing overview of preemption law).
87Id.
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statement, state law may still be displaced under the doctrine of
implied preemption. 88 Implied preemption “occurs where
Congress, through the structure or objectives of a federal
statute, has impliedly precluded state regulation of that area.” 89
Regardless of whether a case involves express or implied
preemption, the judiciary’s task is the same: “to determine
whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and
purpose of the [federal] statute as a whole.” 90 Or stated another
way, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every pre-emption case.” 91
Over the years, the Supreme Court has come to
recognize two types of implied preemption: (1) field
preemption, and (2) conflict preemption. 92 Field preemption
occurs when federal law has been so dominant in a particular
area that “Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.” 93 Conflict preemption can take two forms. The first is called
physical impossibility preemption, and it occurs when
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
The second is called obstacle
physical impossibility.” 94
preemption, and it occurs when “state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” 95
With respect to the battle between state marijuana laws
and the CSA, express preemption is inapplicable because the
CSA does not explicitly remove the possibility of state
regulation of drugs. The CSA does, however, contain a

88O’Reilly,
89Id.

supra note 85, at 65.

supra note 83, at 572 (internal quotations omitted).
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotations

90Denning,
91Wyeth

omitted).
92Id. at 572.
93Nelson, supra note 86, at 227 (internal quotations omitted).
94Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
95Id. (internal quotations omitted)
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preemption provision in 21 U.S.C. § 903. Section 903 provides
as follows:
No provision of this subchapter shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of
the Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties,
to the exclusion of any State law on the same
subject matter which would otherwise be within
the authority of the State, unless there is a
positive conflict between that provision of this
subchapter and that State law so that the two
cannot consistently stand together. 96
Section § 903 clearly takes field preemption off the
Equally clear from § 903 is Congress’s intent to ensure
that conflict preemption remains on the table. Looking to the
two subsets of conflict preemption, it has traditionally been
very difficult to succeed on a physical impossibility preemption
theory. 98 To do so, it must be proven that “state law requires
what federal law prohibits, or state law prohibits what federal law
requires.” 99 That is not present here because a person in, say,
Colorado could comply with both federal and state law by
table. 97

9621

U.S.C. § 903.
supra note 36, at 9 (stating that § 903 “clarifies that Congress
did not intend to entirely occupy the regulatory field concerning
controlled substances or wholly supplant traditional state authority in
the area”).
98Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009) (“Impossibility preemption is a demanding defense.”); see also Garvey, supra note 36, at
10 (“Courts have only rarely invalidated a state law as preempted
under the impossibility prong of the positive conflict test.”).
99Garvey, supra note 36, at 10 (emphasis in original); see also Erwin
Chemerinksy, Constitutional Law: Principles & Policies at 391 (2d ed.
2002) (“If federal law and state law are mutually exclusive, so that a
person could not simultaneously comply with both, the state law is
deemed preempted.”).
97Garvey,
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refraining from the manufacture, distribution, and possession
of marijuana. 100
But, there is an argument to be made that this is not the
correct way to view physical impossibility preemption.
According to Professor Brandon Denning, viewing physical
impossibility preemption in that way renders the doctrine
meaningless because “a finding of impossibility could always
be avoided simply by refraining from engaging in the activity
that is the object of the conflicting regulatory regimes.” 101 As
Professor Denning has explained, physical impossibility
preemption only serves a purpose if it is “viewed from the
perspective of one who is engaging in the very conduct
regulated by both state and federal governments.” 102 Under
that conception of physical impossibility preemption, state laws
legalizing marijuana would be preempted because it would be
physically impossible for a person in Colorado to open a
marijuana dispensary under state law without simultaneously
violating federal law. 103 Although it is certainly an appealing
argument, Professor Denning’s approach is somewhat difficult
to reconcile with language found in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson. 104
In Barnett Bank, the Court was considering whether a
federal law that authorized national banks to sell insurance in
small towns preempted a state law that prohibited national

supra note 86, at 228 n.15 (nothing that the Supreme Court
has held that “if one sovereign’s law purports to give people a right
to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to
prohibit, the ‘physical impossibility’ test is not satisfied; a person
could comply with both state and federal law simply by refraining
from the conduct. Thus, even when state and federal law contradict
each other, it is physically possible to comply with both unless federal
law requires what state law prohibits (or vice versa)”).
101Denning, supra note 83, at 578.
102Id.
103Id. at 578-79.
104517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
100Nelson,
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banks from doing precisely that. 105 Although the Court found
the state law to be preempted under the doctrine of obstacle
preemption, it rejected the physical impossibility preemption
argument. In doing so, the Court explained that this was not a
situation where “the federal law said, ‘you must sell insurance,’
while the state law said, ‘you may not.’” 106 Because a national
bank could comply with both state and federal law by refusing
to sell insurance, there was no physical impossibility
preemption. 107 Thus, the argument goes, physical impossibility
preemption is inapplicable to the marijuana conundrum
because there is an easy way to comply with both laws—do not
grow, distribute, or possess marijuana. Given the language of
Barnett Bank and the Court’s treatment of physical impossibility
preemption as a “very narrow” doctrine, 108 it is unlikely that
state marijuana legalization measures would be preempted
under that doctrine.
It seems more likely that state marijuana legalization
measures would be preempted under the second subset of
Obstacle
conflict preemption—obstacle preemption. 109
preemption is appropriate when the state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

105Id.

at 27 (“The question in this case is whether a federal statute that
permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns pre-empts a
state statute that forbids them to do so.”).
106Id. at 31.
107See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230
P.3d 518, 528 (Or. 2010) (en banc) (explaining that in Barnett Bank it
was not physically impossible to comply with both state and federal
law because “[a] national bank could simply refrain from selling
insurance”); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment) (questioning the physical impossibility
preemption doctrine in part because federal and state law may give
conflicting commands even though “an individual could comply with
both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior”).
108Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
109Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 10-11 (focusing analysis more on
obstacle preemption than physical impossibility preemption because
the state laws “would likely survive the impossibility prong”).
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purposes and objectives of Congress.” 110 To determine whether
a state law serves as an obstacle, the courts must “examin[e] the
federal statute as a whole and identify[] its purpose and
intended effects.” 111
Determining the purpose of the CSA is an easy task. It
was drafted with one goal in mind—eliminating the abuse,
production, and illicit trafficking of certain psychotropic
To achieve that goal, Congress created a
drugs. 112
comprehensive regulatory regime prohibiting the possession,
distribution, or manufacture of certain drugs (i.e., Schedule I)
and regulated the possession, distribution, or manufacture of
other drugs (i.e., Schedules II-V). 113 In doing so, Congress made
clear that the CSA applies to drugs that are manufactured,
distributed, and possessed purely intrastate. 114 Congress found
that such “[f]ederal control of the intrastate incidents of the
traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective
control of the interstate incidents” of drug trafficking. 115
Congress believed that its ultimate objective could not be
reached if there were an exemption that allowed the
manufacture, distribution, or possession of locally grown
marijuana.
The application of the CSA to purely intrastate activity
was attacked in Gonzalez v. Raich as an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. In Raich,
the Supreme Court upheld the CSA and declared that Congress
110Pacific

Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
111Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (internal
quotations omitted).
112See 21 U.S.C. § 801a(1) (setting forth Congress’s findings regarding
the need for the CSA); see also Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 13, 20 (2005)
(“The main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled
substances.”).
113Raich, 545 U.S. at 13-14.
11421 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6).
11521 U.S.C. § 801(6).
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had the authority to regulate even locally grown marijuana that
never crossed a state line. 116 According to the Court, exempting
marijuana that was “locally cultivated for personal use . . . may
have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this
And, the Court
extraordinarily popular substance.” 117
recognized that a state law authorizing the use of medical
marijuana (even if locally grown) would “have a significant
impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for
marijuana.” 118 Perhaps most importantly for purposes of the
current debate, the Raich Court spoke approvingly of
Congress’s determination that allowing intrastate marijuana to
escape the CSA’s reach “would undermine the orderly
enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme.” 119
Such undermining, however, has been occurring since
the Ogden Memorandum was released in 2009. Because of state
legalization efforts and Department of Justice acquiescence, the
CSA’s regulatory scheme has been significantly undermined.
The goal of the CSA was to eliminate the market for marijuana,
and “[l]iberal regimes like Colorado’s and Washington’s are
diametrically opposed to th[at] goal.” 120 It does not take a law
degree to see that a state law authorizing the production,
distribution, and use of marijuana makes it difficult for the
federal government to achieve its goal of eradicating marijuana.
It is made even more difficult when the state actually benefits
from increased use of the substance that federal law is trying to
decrease.
545 U.S. at 19. For those unfamiliar with the case, Raich
involved several individuals who sought to use and grow marijuana
for medicinal purposes under California’s Compassionate Use Act. Id.
at 5-7. The individuals sued the Attorney General of the United States,
seeking a declaration that the CSA’s prohibition on the manufacture,
distribution, and possession of marijuana was unconstitutional as
applied to locally grown marijuana that did not travel in interstate
commerce. Id. at 7.
117Id. at 28.
118Id. at 30.
119Id. at 28.
120Denning, supra note 83, at 579.
116Raich,
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Take Colorado, for example. It legalized marijuana for
recreational use in 2012, and in 2015 Colorado collected
approximately $135 million in tax revenue from the marijuana
industry. 121 That money has been used to fund a variety of state
programs and projects ranging from school construction and
street paving to bullying prevention. 122 If people stop selling,
smoking, and growing marijuana in Colorado, then the state
and local governments will lose money. If the government loses
money, it will cut programs and services. No government
desires to do either of those things. So, what does Colorado
want? More marijuana sales! When do they want them? Now!
The good news for Colorado is that it is getting what it
wants. The data shows that when a state legalizes marijuana,
use of the drug increases in that state. 123 That should come as
Public Radio, All Things Considered, Where Does
Colorado's Marijuana Money Go? (Oct. 1, 2016) (transcript available at,
http://www.npr.org/2016/10/01/496226348/where-doescolorados-marijuana-money-go).
122Id. (reporting that money from marijuana tax revenues was used to
build schools, provide for the homeless, and create college
scholarships); see also Carlos Illescas, Marijuana Sales Tax Huge Boon for
Colorado Cities, Denver Post (May 26, 2016) (available at,
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/26/marijuana-sales-taxrevenue-huge-boon-for-colorado-cities/) (quoting an official of a
small Colorado town as saying: “We have such as small tax base . . .
.Medical and retail marijuana have definitely helped the town’s
bottom line. I’d be lying if I said it didn’t.”); Mahita Gajanan, Colorado
Will Use Extra Marijuana Revenue to Prevent Bullying in Schools, Time
Magazine
(Sep.
28,
2016)
(available,
at
http://time.com/4511895/colorado-surplus-marijuana-tax-revenuebully-prevention/) (reporting that $2.9 million in marijuana tax
revenues was used to create a bullying prevention program at 50
schools).
123Beau Kilmer, If California legalizes marijuana, consumption will likely
increase. But is that a bad thing?, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 16, 2016)
(reporting that after legalization, marijuana use increased in Colorado
and Washington); see also Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area, The Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado: The Impact
(Jan.
2016)
(available
at,
http://www.rmhidta.org/html/FINAL%20NSDUH%20Results121National
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no surprise. After all, allowing “profit-maximizing firms to
produce, sell, and advertise” 124 an item that was previously
only available on the black-market will result in an increase in
that item’s use. So, state legalization efforts have led to an
increase in the very activity that the CSA prohibits and seeks to
eliminate altogether.
That type of conflict between the effect of a state law and
the objective of a federal law is what obstacle preemption is
designed to address. When previously confronted with an
analogous situation, the Supreme Court struck down the
offending state law in Michigan Canners & Freezers v.
Agricultural Board. 125 The Michigan Canners Court held that the
federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act preempted the Michigan
Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act because the
Michigan law stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 126
The federal law was designed to improve the bargaining
power of farmers when they brought their food to market. 127
One provision of the federal law prevented an association of
food producers from interfering with an individual producer’s
decision about whether to bring food to the market individually
or to sell it through a producers’ association. 128 The Michigan
law, on the other hand, stated that a producers’ association was
the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of a particular

%20Jan%202016%20Release.pdf) (stating that “in the two year
average (2013/2014) since Colorado legalized recreational marijuana,
youth past month marijuana use increased 20 percent compared to the
two year average prior to legalization (2011/2012)” while at the same
time “nationally youth past month marijuana use declined 4
percent”); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances
Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 17 (2013) (“There is little doubt,
then, that marijuana use will increase following state legalization.”).
124Kilmer, supra note 123.
125467 U.S. 461 (1984).
126Id. at 478 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
127Id. at 463-64.
128Id. at 464.
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food item. 129 Individual producers were required to pay a fee
to the association and abide by the terms of the association’s
contracts. 130 In other words, the Michigan law “empower[ed]
producers’ associations to do precisely what the federal Act
forbids them to do.” 131 The Michigan law, therefore, was struck
down by the Supreme Court under the obstacle preemption
doctrine. 132
Just like the Michigan law authorized producers’
associations to engage in conduct that federal law prohibited,
those states that have legalized marijuana have “empower[ed]
[marijuana growers, distributors, and users] to do precisely
what the federal Act forbids them to do.” 133 It is difficult to
escape that reality. 134 So, why has no federal court ruled that
the CSA preempts state marijuana legalization laws? Because
the Department of Justice—through its “policy of benign
neglect” 135—has refused to bring a lawsuit challenging state
marijuana legalization laws as preempted under the obstacle
preemption doctrine. 136
In response to the Department of Justice’s decision not
to file a preemption lawsuit, Oklahoma and Nebraska made a
valiant effort to have the Supreme Court rule on the issue. They
129Id.

at 466.

130Michigan

Canners & Freezers Ass’n, 467 U.S. at 467-68.
at 477-78.
132Id. at 478 (holding that the Michigan law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress” and “therefore, the Michigan Act is pre-empted”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
133Id. at 477-78.
134See generally Denning, supra note 83, at 580 (“At the risk of seeming
obtuse, I find it self-evident that state legalization regimes permitting
marijuana use for medical or recreational purposes present a
substantial obstacle to the implementation of a federal law that (1)
recognizes no medical use for marijuana and (2) seeks to eliminate the
national market in marijuana by banning all production, possession,
and transfer.”)
135Denning, supra note 83, at 583.
136Id. at 581 (stating that “[o]nly the DOJ’s announced policy of
forbearance keeps this conflict from coming to a head”).
131Id.
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brought a lawsuit against Colorado directly in the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution
and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), both of which vest the Supreme Court
with “original jurisdiction” over a lawsuit between two
states. 137 In that lawsuit, Oklahoma and Nebraska argued that
Colorado’s marijuana legalization law “conflicts with and
otherwise stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” 138 For reasons unknown and unstated,
the Supreme Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to hear
the case. 139
Although no federal court has ruled on the preemption
issue, a handful of state courts have addressed it. 140 Of that
handful of courts, the most notable opinion is the Supreme
Court of Oregon’s in Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of

137Motion

for Leave to File Complaint, Nebraska & Oklahoma v.
Colorado, Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 18, 2014)
(available
at,
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/Neb.-Okla.-original-suit-vs.-Colorado-1218-14.pdf).
138Id. at 23.
139Nebraska, et al. v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of motion for leave to file complaint)
(arguing that the Court should have exercised its original jurisdiction
to hear the case instead of “denying, without explanation, Nebraska
and Oklahoma’s motion for leave to file a complaint”). In the wake of
the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the case, Nebraska and Colorado
sought permission to intervene in a lawsuit brought by some private
parties against Colorado. That lawsuit had been previously dismissed
by a U.S. District Court judge on the basis that private parties could
not seek preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Safe Streets
Alliance, et al. v. John Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado, et al., No. 1:15CV-00349, 2016 WL 223815, at *3, *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 19, 2016). The
plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
Nebraska and Oklahoma sought permission to intervene in that
appeal. The Tenth Circuit allowed the intervention, and the parties
are awaiting a decision on the merits. Safe Streets Alliance, et al. v. John
Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado, Order Granting Motion to
Intervene, Appeal No. 16-1048 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016).
140See Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 14-15 (summarizing several state
court rulings).
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Labor and Industries. 141 The Emerald Steel court concluded that
the CSA preempted Oregon’s Medical Marijuana Act, which
provided that people who had been issued a medical marijuana
card could manufacture, distribute, and possess marijuana. 142
According to the court, the Oregon law stood “as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes of the federal law.” 143
The court further explained that when Congress passed the
CSA, it “did not intend to enact a limited prohibition on the use
of marijuana—i.e., to prohibit the use of marijuana unless a
state chose to authorize its use.” 144 Instead, Congress meant for
the CSA to “impose[] a blanket prohibition on the use of
marijuana without regard to state permission to use.” 145 And,
there is no U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that “states
can authorize their citizens to engage in conduct that Congress
explicitly has forbidden.” 146 Some scholars 147 and a few

141348

Or. 159 (2010) (en banc).
at 161; but see County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 461, 482 (Cal. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that the CSA does not
preempt California’s medical marijuana identification card law
because “the purpose of the CSA is to combat recreational drug use,
not to regulate a state’s medical practices”).
143Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc., 348 Or. at 186.
144Id. at 177-78.
145Id. at 178.
146Id. at 183.
147See Sam Kamin, Pot Prohibition is Almost Over; Oklahoma, Nebraska’s
Suit is Doomed, THE CANNABIST (Jun. 29, 2015) (available at,
http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/06/29/pot-marijuanaoklahoma-nebraska-lawsuit-colorado/37014/#disqus_thread) (law
professor opining that Colorado’s marijuana legalization measure is
not preempted by the CSA because “the federal government cannot
force state officials (cannot commandeer them, to use the
constitutional term) to enforce” federal law); see also Robert A. Mikos,
On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked
Power to Legalize a Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009)
(arguing that “to say that Congress may thereby preempt state
inaction (which is what legalization amounts to, after all) would, in
effect, permit Congress to command the states to take some action—
namely, to proscribe medical marijuana.
The Court’s anti142Id.
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judges 148 have argued that a finding that the CSA preempts
state marijuana legalization laws would run afoul of the anticommandeering principle embodied in the Tenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. That argument is creative and
thought-provoking. But, it is wide of the mark—at least as it
relates to what has actually happened in those states that have
legalized marijuana.
The Tenth Amendment provides as follows: “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” 149 The Supreme Court has read
that language to prevent the federal government from
“commandeering” state governments by requiring them to
enforce federal law. 150 Perhaps the most significant anticommandeering case is Printz v. United States. 151 At issue in
Printz was the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which
contained a provision requiring state and local police officers to
conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. 152 The
Court struck down that provision under the Tenth Amendment
because the federal government “may not compel the State to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” 153
Undoubtedly, the anti-commandeering doctrine
applied in Printz would prevent the federal government from
forcing state and local police officers to enforce the CSA’s
marijuana prohibition. It is also beyond debate that the federal
commandeering rule, however, clearly prohibits Congress from doing
this.”).
148See, e.g., Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus.,
348 Or. 159, 191 (2010) (en banc) (Walters, J., dissenting) (citing the
anti-commandeering doctrine as one of the reasons why the CSA does
not preempt Oregon’s medical marijuana law).
149U.S. CONST. amend. X,
150New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that
“[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program”).
151521 U.S. 898 (1997).
152Id. at 903.
153Id. at 933 (internal quotations omitted).
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government could not mandate that all states criminalize
marijuana. Neither of those things, however, would result from
a court holding that the CSA preempts state marijuana
legalization laws. A finding that the CSA preempts a state
marijuana legalization law would result in the state having no
law—authorizing or forbidding—marijuana. And, that is
entirely constitutional because states are free by virtue of the
anti-commandeering doctrine to decriminalize marijuana
through the repeal of their laws that prohibit the manufacture,
distribution, and possession of marijuana. 154
There is, however, a critical difference between
decriminalizing marijuana by repealing existing law and
authorizing marijuana, regulating it, and making a tremendous
amount of money by taxing it. Recognizing as much, the law of
preemption distinguishes between failing to criminalize an
activity and making the activity lawful. 155 As a panel of the
California Court of Appeals explained, “[w]hen an act is
prohibited by federal law, but neither prohibited nor
authorized by state law, there is no obstacle preemption.” 156
But, when a state moves beyond decriminalization and passes
a law that affirmatively authorizes and regulates what federal
law prohibits, the state’s law is preempted, and the anticommandeering doctrine is not implicated. 157
154See

Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 13-14 (explaining that under the
“Tenth Amendment and preemption precedent” a state could exempt
marijuana-related activities from criminal penalties under state law).
155See Pack v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 651
(Cal. App. Ct. 2012). In Pack, the court held that the CSA preempted
a city ordinance requiring an expensive permit to grow or distribute
medical marijuana. Id. at 638. The court’s decision was accepted for
review by the Supreme Court of California, but the appeal was
dismissed by request of the parties. Pack v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles, Case No. B228781, Order of Aug. 22, 2012) (available at,
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?di
st=2&doc_id=1961761&doc_no=B228781).
156Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651.
157Id. at 652 (“The City’s ordinance, however, goes beyond
decriminalization into authorization . . . . A law which authorizes

74

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

Looking again to Colorado as an example, the state’s
2012 marijuana legalization measure did more than simply
repeal the state’s statute that criminalized marijuana—it
created a regulatory scheme that authorizes, permits, and
collects large fees 158 from marijuana-related activities that are
prohibited by federal law.
More specifically, Colorado
developed “procedures for the issuance, renewal, suspension,
and revocation of licenses; provide[d] a schedule of licensing
and renewal fees; and specif[ied] requirements for licensees to
follow regarding physical security, video surveillance, labeling,
health and safety precautions, and product advertising.” 159
There is now an entire state bureaucracy focused on nothing
more than administering the marijuana industry. 160 Because
the state law expressly authorizes what federal law prohibits, it
is preempted because it serves as an obstacle to the fulfillment
of Congress’ goal to eliminate the manufacturing, distribution,
possession, and use of marijuana.
Of course, it is unlikely that a federal court will have the
opportunity to reach that conclusion unless the Department of
Justice changes its approach and files a lawsuit against the
individuals to engage in conduct that the federal Act forbids stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress and is therefore preempted.”) (internal
quotations and alterations omitted); see also Emerald Steel Fabricators,
Inc. v. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 348 Or. 159, 177-78 (2010) (en banc)
(explaining that Oregon’s law was preempted because it went beyond
exempting marijuana offenses from state prosecutions by
“affirmatively authoriz[ing]” marijuana manufacturing, distribution,
and possession); Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 14 (stating that the
“affirmative act of regulating and licensing marijuana cultivation and
distribution may not invoke the same Tenth Amendment protections
enjoyed by the states’ initial decision to simply remove marijuanarelated penalties under state law”).
158Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 5 (reporting that Colorado imposes
a 25% tax on retail marijuana sales).
159Id.
160See https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement
(website of the Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Colorado
Department of Revenue).
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offending states. Although the filing of such a lawsuit after
years of sitting on the sidelines while state marijuana
legalization measures spread like wildfire will ruffle feathers
and disrupt what has become a billion-dollar industry, it is the
approach dictated by the law (as opposed to personal
preference or political expediency). Aside from the preemption
issues discussed above, the Department of Justice’s current
approach violates the Take Care Clause.

V. TAKE CARE CLAUSE
The Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution is, in
comparison to other constitutional provisions, largely
unknown and infrequently litigated. 161 It provides in simple
and direct language that the President “shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.” 162 Despite its brevity and relative
obscurity, the Take Care Clause packs a mighty punch. It
ensures that the power of our federal government is dispersed
among the different branches, 163 and it prevents executive
“lawlessness in the form of overreach or inaction.” 164
The Take Care Clause was designed to prevent
Presidents (and their surrogates, such as the Attorney General)
from doing exactly what the Department of Justice has done by
refusing to enforce the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana in those
states that have passed legalization measures. It has been
argued that the Department’s current approach is an
unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion rather than a

161See

Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness,
38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 70 (2015) (stating that “[o]nly a few
Supreme Court cases have interpreted the Take Care Clause”).
162U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
163See Todd Garvey, The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the
Enforcement of the Law, Congressional Research Service (Sept. 4, 2014)
(explaining that the “Take Care Clause makes a significant
contribution to the separation of powers”).
164Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and
Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 183, 196 (2016).
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breach of the Take Care Clause. 165 That argument lacks merit
because there is a difference between prosecutorial discretion in
individual cases (constitutional and necessary) and a blanket
policy of non-enforcement (unconstitutional and dangerous).
As explained below, the Department’s approach falls on the
unconstitutional and dangerous side of the line.
To understand the Take Care Clause and its purpose, a
brief historical review is necessary. Prior to the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, the English crown possessed suspension
and dispensation powers. 166 Generally speaking, those powers
allowed the king to nullify or simply disregard statutes passed
by Parliament. 167 Because Parliament rarely met and the king
was viewed as the “source of all law,” the suspension and
dispensation powers were viewed for many years as “useful
and broadly accepted lubricants” that allowed the king to
adjust the law as the circumstances required. 168 Things changed
when King James II came to power. 169 He drew the ire of
Parliament and the people when he began using his suspension
and dispensation to “systematically dispense with a vast array
of religious legislation and rules governing the universities.” 170
His actions contributed to the Glorious Revolution, which
resulted in the ascension of William III to the crown and the
elimination of the suspension and dispensation powers. 171 The
elimination of those powers was a “central achievement of the
English Revolution . . . . [and] formed an important backdrop to
the American constitutional enterprise.” 172
165Id.

at 200 (“In the context of federal marijuana law enforcement, it
seems clear that the Obama administration’s guidance to prosecutors
regarding the allocation of scarce resources is nothing more than an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”).
166Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
VAND. L. REV. 671, 690-91 (2014).
167Cruz, supra note 161, at 66.
168Price, supra note 166, at 691.
169Id.
170Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 805 (internal quotations
omitted).
171See Price, supra note 166 at 691 (explaining that “William III and
Mary II replaced King James on the throne. As part of the new
constitutional settlement, the monarch was henceforth denied
suspending and dispensing powers.”).
172Id. at 692.
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Given the experience of their English ancestors, our
Founding Fathers took pains to ensure that the President lacked
the authority to “make, or alter, or dispense with the laws.” 173
Thus, they drafted the Take Care Clause and included it in
Article II, § 3. The Clause places upon the President “an
obligation and affirmative duty” to enforce the laws passed by
Congress. 174 It is worth emphasizing “how strong the language
of the Take Care Clause is. It is pitched at the highest register
of constitutional obligation. The President shall—not may.” 175
In fact, it has been argued that the Take Care Clause is one of
only two duties expressly imposed on the President by the
Constitution—“he must take the Oath of Office . . . and he shall
take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 176 The
obligation is not simply the President’s; rather, it is one that is
borne by all Executive Branch officials. 177
Although the President has a role in the legislative
process (most notably, the veto power), when a bill becomes a
law the President’s “legislative role comes to an end and is
supplanted by his express constitutional obligation under” the
Take Care Clause. 178 Noticeably absent from the Take Care
Clause is a footnote clarifying that the President only has to
faithfully execute the laws that he personally agrees with or
those that are popular with his political base. 179 Permitting the
supra note 163, at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
supra note 161, at 69.
175Brief for the Cato Institute, Professors Randy E. Barnett & Jeremy
Rabkin as Amici Curiae, United States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case
No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1377723, at *10 (Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the
history and purpose of the Take Care Clause).
176Id. (internal citations omitted).
177See generally Kamin, supra note 164 at 196 (stating that under the
Take Care Clause “the federal executive is charged with taking care
that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed”); see also
Garvey, supra note 163, at 5 (explaining that the “President and
executive branch officers must ‘faithfully’ implement and execute the
law[s]”).
178Garvey, supra note 136, at 5..
179See Cruz, supra note 171, at 73 (stating that “the President’s
obligation to enforce the laws does not include the power to disregard
duly enacted laws when they become politically inconvenient”); see
also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 794 (explaining that the
Constitution “imposes on the President a duty to enforce existing
173Garvey,
174Cruz,
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President to ignore or modify congressional enactments would
violate the separation of powers doctrine by “cloth[ing] the
executive branch with the power of lawmaking.” 180 If the
Framers wanted the President to have that type of power, they
would have given him suspension and dispensation powers
instead of saddling him with an affirmative duty to faithfully
execute the laws passed by Congress. As Professors Delahunty
and Yoo have explained, a “deliberate decision to leave a
substantial area of statutory law unenforced or underenforced
is a serious breach of Presidential duty.” 181
If you want to see an example of such a breach of
Presidential duty, look no further than the Department of
Justice’s approach to state marijuana legalization efforts. The
CSA is a longstanding federal law that makes it clear as day that
marijuana is prohibited nationwide for both medicinal and
recreational use. Nonetheless, the Department announced that
it would not prosecute marijuana offenders in those states that
passed legalization measures. Similarly, the Department
refused to institute preemption proceedings against the
offending states. To the contrary, when two states (Oklahoma
and Nebraska) tried to do the Department’s job for it by suing
Colorado over its marijuana legalization law, the Department
actually filed a brief supporting Colorado. 182 Yes, you read that
correctly—the U.S. Department of Justice came to the aid of the
state that was violating federal law instead of those that were
seeking to enforce it.

statutes, regardless of any policy differences with the Congresses that
enacted them or the presidents who signed them”). The president
may, however, refuse to enforce a law if he believes the law violates
the Constitution. See Cruz, supra note 36, at 73-74 (“[I]f a President
faces a decision between enforcing a law that Congress has passed and
enforcing the Constitution, many scholars have argued that he is
obligated to enforce the Constitution.”). But, there have been very few
circumstances where a president’s nonenforcement decision was
based on a constitutional concern. Id. at 74.
180Garvey, supra note 163, at 5.
181Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 785.
182Lyle Denniston, U.S. Opposes Marijuana Challenge by Colorado’s
Neighbors, SCOTUSBlog (Dec. 17, 2015) (available at,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/u-s-opposes-marijuanachallenge-by-colorados-neighbors/).
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For the approximately thirty-nine-year period between
the passage of the CSA in 1970 and 2009, the Department of
Justice (in both Democratic and Republican administrations)
took care to see that the CSA’s marijuana prohibition was
faithfully executed. That all changed approximately one year
into President Obama’s term when his Deputy Attorney
General announced that the Department would no longer seek
to prosecute “individuals whose actions [we]re in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing
for the medical use of marijuana.” 183 A later announcement
extended that policy of non-enforcement to those living in
states that authorized recreational marijuana. 184 Further, those
states have become marijuana meccas where people grow, sell,
and smoke marijuana openly. But, the words written into law
by Congress remain unchanged—marijuana is a Schedule I
controlled substance that is strictly prohibited, and its
manufacture, distribution, and possession are punishable by
imprisonment. What had changed, however, is that the words
written into law by Congress did not align with the policy
preferences of those heading up the Executive Branch. 185
So, the Department of Justice simply decided to suspend
the CSA in certain states and to grant dispensations to people
183October

19, 2009, Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
David W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys.
184Aug. 29, 2013, Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United
States Attorneys.
185Both President Obama and Attorney General Holder have made
public statements regarding their dissatisfaction with the CSA’s
treatment of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance. See, e.g.
Jann S. Wenner, The Day After: Obama on His Legacy, Trump's Win and
the Path Forward, ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE (Nov. 29, 2016) (available
at, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/obama-on-hislegacy-trumps-win-and-the-path-forward-w452527)
(quoting
President Obama as saying that he believes marijuana should be
treated the “same way we do with cigarettes or alcohol”); see also Nick
Wing, Eric Holder Says It’s Ridiculous To Treat Weed Like Heroin, But He
Can’t Do Anything About It Now, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2016)
(quoting Eric Holder as saying “we treat marijuana in the same way
that we treat heroin now, and that clearly is not appropriate”).
Ironically, as the Attorney General, Holder could have addressed the
issue lawfully by exercising his authority under 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b)
to remove marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA. He failed to do so.
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who grow, sell, and possess marijuana in those states. There is
one slight problem. The American President and his surrogates
in the Department of Justice are not 17th-century English
monarchs who possess suspension and dispensation powers. 186
That was the whole point of the Take Care Clause. 187 If the
President and the attorney general wanted marijuana to be
treated differently by federal law, they should have lobbied
Congress or followed the administrative rescheduling process
that Congress set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 811.
Some have defended the Department’s nonenforcement policy as a permissible exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, rather than an abdication of the “take care” duty. 188
That argument has some surface appeal. But, it crumbles upon
closer inspection because there is a difference between
prosecutorial discretion and a policy of non-enforcement. 189
The former is entirely permissible and virtually
unchallengeable, the latter is a violation of the Take Care
Clause. 190 To understand why, it is necessary to look at what
prosecutorial discretion is and the purpose that it serves.
The concept of prosecutorial discretion reflects an
understanding that the executive branch’s duty to enforce the
186See

4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980) (opinion by Office
Legal Counsel explaining that “[t]he President has no ‘dispensing
power[,]’ meaning that the President and his subordinates may not
lawfully defy an Act of Congress if the Act is constitutional”).
187See Cruz, supra note 161, at 114 (“The Take Care Clause was
explicitly included in the Constitution to prevent the President from
wielding the suspension and dispensation powers that had been
abused by English kings.”).
188See Kamin, supra note 164, at 200 (opining that “the Obama
administration’s guidance to prosecutors regarding the allocation of
scarce resources is nothing more than an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion”).
189See Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, United
States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1319656, at
*3 (Apr. 4, 2016) (explaining that “the Executive’s authority to exercise
discretion in the enforcement of the laws does not encompass the far
broader power to authorize . . . class-wide relief”).
190See Cruz, supra note 161, at 77 (“[I]t would violate the Take Care
Clause for a President to invoke prosecutorial discretion as a means
of failing to enforce those laws of which the President disapproves.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
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laws does not have to be “performed robotically.” 191 Rather,
federal prosecutors (as the President’s surrogates) have the
power to decide whether to bring charges in a particular case.
Generally speaking, a prosecutor’s refusal to bring charges is
not subject to judicial review. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has explained: “It follows, as an incident of the
constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of
the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecutions.” 192
Generally speaking, the decision of whether to institute
a prosecution is made by a prosecutor after considering the facts
and circumstances of a particular situation. It is a case-specific
judgment call that is based on such things as the strength of the
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the constitutionality of
police conduct, the preferences of a victim, the potential
defendant’s criminal history, and resource constraints. A
federal prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is to be guided by the
parameters set forth in a chapter of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual
entitled “Principles of Federal Prosecution.” 193 That chapter
begins with the general rule that an “attorney for the
government should commence or recommend federal
prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct
constitutes a federal offense, that the admissible evidence will
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, and
that a substantial federal interest would be served by the
prosecution.” 194 A case that meets those requirements should
be prosecuted, 195 unless “(1) The person is subject to effective

191See

Price, supra note 166, at 696.
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
193U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220
(available
at,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200).
194Id.
195See Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in
Federal Prosecutorial Discretion, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 237 (2003)
(discussing the Principles of Federal Prosecution and stating that “the
expectation is that where legal evidence of an offense exists, a
prosecutor is expected to initiate criminal proceedings”).
192United

82

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (2) There exists an
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” 196
As a trio of former U.S. Attorneys General 197 have
explained, “[e]ach of these situations is intensely case—and
person—specific. . . .the core of the discretionary authority
exclusively reserved to the Executive is the authority to make a
decision in particular cases regarding particular individuals.” 198
Put another way, “executive officials hold discretion only to
make case-specific exceptions to enforcement.” 199 Thus, the
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion does not provide the
Attorney General with the authority to decline prosecutions
“on a categorical or prospective basis.” 200 Nor can the Attorney
General rely on the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion to
justify the creation of a policy against enforcing a particular
provision of federal law. 201 Prosecutorial discretion is not
unfettered—the “mere invocation of prosecutorial or
enforcement discretion is not to be treated as a magical
incantation” 202 that allows the executive to disregard
congressional enactments.
Although the judiciary generally refuses to review
exercises of prosecutorial discretion, the courts have recognized
that there is a difference between the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in an individual case and an agency non-enforcement
policy. 203 As the Department of Justice itself previously
196U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220
(available
at,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200).
197The trio consisted of Edwin Meese III, Richard Thornburg, and John
Ashcroft. Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae,
United States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL
1319656, at *1 (Apr. 4, 2016).
198Id. at *11, *13.
199Price, supra note 166, at 677.
200Cruz, supra note 161, at 76-77 (internal quotations omitted).
201See Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, United
States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1319656, at
*13 (Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the difference between individualized
prosecutorial discretion and a blanket policy of nonenforcement).
202Garvey, supra note 163, at 25 (internal quotations omitted).
203See id. at 25-26 (discussing the judiciary’s attempts to distinguish
between traditional prosecutorial discretion and an agency
nonenforcement policy).
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admitted, “the individual prosecutorial decision is
distinguishable from instances in which courts have reviewed
the legality of general Executive Branch policies.” 204 While the
courts will not “assume the essentially Executive function of
deciding whether a particular alleged violator should be
prosecuted,” they will make the “conventionally judicial
determination of whether certain fixed policies allegedly
followed by the Justice Department and the United States
Attorney’s office lie outside the constitutional and statutory
limits of ‘prosecutorial discretion.’” 205 And, the question of
whether a Department of Justice policy of not enforcing a
particular law violates the Take Care Clause is one that can be
reviewed by the judicial branch. 206
It is a good thing that such review is available. Consider
the consequences of allowing the Executive Branch to refuse the
enforcement of duly-enacted laws under the guise of
prosecutorial discretion. An Executive Branch that believed
there was too much environmental regulation could refuse to
prosecute people who dumped pollutants into the waterways.
An Executive Branch that disagreed with federal firearm laws
could refuse to prosecute people who sold guns to convicted
2048

Op. O.L.C. 101, 126 (1984).
v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
206Id. at 679, n.19 (quoting the Take Care Clause and noting that the
“law has long recognized the distinction between judicial usurpation
of discretionary authority and judicial review of the statutory and
constitutional limits to that authority. Judicial review of the latter sort
is normally available unless Congress has expressly withdrawn it.”)
(internal citations omitted). Interestingly, the Supreme Court of the
United States last term asked the parties in the case of United States v.
Texas to address whether the Obama administration’s policy of not
enforcing certain immigration laws constituted a violation of the Take
Care Clause. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Supreme Court Adds ‘Take
Care Clause’ to the DAPA Debate, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY
BLOG
(Jan.
19,
2016)
(available
at,
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-supreme-court-adds%E2%80%98take-care-clause%E2%80%99-to-the-dapa-debate). The
issue was briefed and argued, but the Court did not issue a decision
in the case because Justice Scalia died during the pendency of the case
and the remaining justices deadlocked 4-4. See United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (“The judgment is affirmed by an
equally divided court.”).
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felons. An Executive Branch that disliked the tax system could
refrain from prosecuting tax fraud cases. And, an Executive
Branch that favored drug legalization could stop prosecuting
drug dealers. If that is what prosecutorial discretion allows,
then it “threatens to undermine the constitutional lawmaking
process.” 207 And, we should stop referring to the bills passed
by Congress and signed by the President as “laws.” A more apt
description would be “suggestions for the Executive Branch.”
The Take Care Clause was designed to prevent that very thing
from happening.
At bottom, the Department of Justice’s refusal to enforce
the CSA’s marijuana prohibition in those states that have
legalized marijuana is not an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. The decision of whether to prosecute is not being
made on an individualized basis—a federal prosecutor is not
considering the evidence, looking at the circumstances,
applying the factors set forth in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, and
deciding whether a prosecution is warranted against a
particular suspect. Rather, there is an articulated nonenforcement policy that effectively exempts the residents of
twenty-six states from federal marijuana law. As the U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary
reported, “the breadth of the Justice Department’s position on
marijuana non-enforcement goes well beyond the limits of
prosecutorial discretion . . . the guidance to U.S. Attorneys
establishes a formal, department-wide policy of selective nonenforcement of an Act of Congress.” 208 In his famous speech
entitled “The Federal Prosecutor,” then-Attorney General (later
Justice) Robert H. Jackson warned against such behavior,
stating: “The federal government could not enforce one kind of
law in one place and another kind elsewhere. . . . the only longterm policy that will save federal justice from being discredited
by entanglements with local politics is that it confine itself to
strict and impartial enforcement of federal law, letting the chips

supra note 161, at 78.
No. 113-377 of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House
of Representatives, regarding Executive Needs to Faithfully Observe
and Respect Congressional Enactments of Law (ENFORCE) Act of
2014 (Mar. 7, 2014).
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fall in the community where they may.” 209 The Department of
Justice has disregarded Justice Jackson’s admonition, choosing
instead to adopt a policy that violates the President’s duty to
“take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 210

VI. CONCLUSION
The approach that the Department of Justice has taken
to state laws legalizing marijuana over the past eight years must
not continue. At the end of the day, federal law is federal law—
meaning that it applies equally in all fifty states regardless of
what laws a state may pass. It is not only terrible policy for the
federal government to allow states to make a mockery of federal
law, but it is also unconstitutional. The notion that people in
one part of the country can violate federal law with impunity
while people in another part of the country go to federal prison
for engaging in the same conduct is un-American. If the time
has come to change the way federal law treats marijuana, then
that change needs to occur in a lawful manner—either by
passing a bill that is signed into law by the President or by
following the administrative rescheduling procedure set forth
in 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b). Until that occurs, the Department of
Justice should return to doing its job by enforcing federal
marijuana law uniformly throughout the United States.
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